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INTRODUCTION 
Depo-Provera has been a scientific and political battleground for over twenty 
years. At stake have been the reproductive health of women, the marketing of a 
long-acting contraceptive by a multinational corporation, and international family 
planning and population control. Seventy nations have approved its use as a fe-
male contraceptive, but the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has not, 
because the drug is a suspected carcinogen. FDA's decision means marketing of 
Depo-Provera as a contraceptive is forbidden in the United States and in U.S. 
foreign aid programs. FDA's decision also means the drug is less likely to be used 
in Third World family planning programs. 
Depo-Provera's administrative odyssey provides an opportunity to examine 
government regulation of the contemporary pharmaceutical revolution in contra-
ception and FDA's technology transfer function, i.e., determining whether a con-
traceptive drug is safe and effective for general use. Depo-Provera's odyssey also 
provides the opportunity to examine three questions about the risk-management 
process the Agency uses to perform its technological transfer function. Why did 
FDA have to rely on ambiguous and uncertain scientific research about a drug's 
carcinogenic risk? How did FDA weave together uncertain scientific facts with 
political and social values to make drug risk-management decisions? How politi-
cally and scientifically accountable was FDA in making its carcinogenic risk-man-
agement decisions about a contraceptive drug? In sum, Depo-Provera's odyssey 
provides the opportunity to further our understanding of the politics of regulatory 
science. 
The conventional view of the risk-management process provides a beginning 
point for answering these questions. The risk-management process, according to 
this view, is based on a two-stage model. 1 Risk assessment, the first stage, "is the 
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use of the factual base to define the health effects of exposure of individuals or 
populations to hazardous materials or situations. " 2 Risk acceptability, the second 
stage, "is the process of ... integrating the results of risk assessment ... with 
social, economic, and political concerns to reach its decision. " 3 The conventional 
view allows us to identify the risk-assessment and -acceptability elements of the 
Agency's decision, but it cannot explain the controversy over both the assess-
ment and acceptability of the drug's risk because this viewpoint assumes a sepa-
ration of fact and value. An alternative view holds that the strict separation of 
facts and values cannot be maintained in practice because the scientific basis of 
risk assessment is often incomplete and, therefore, policies based on that infor-
mation become the subject of social, economic, and political debate "for their 
science alone, even if the critics really oppose the policies for quite different 
reasons.' '4 
To see how this happened in the Depo-Provera debate will involve an examina-
tion of the major elements of the drug approval process through which Depo-Pro-
vera has journeyed. Part I will examine Depo-Pro vera's premarket testing experi-
ence. Part II will explore FDA's Depo-Provera decisions: the role of advisory 
committees in the 1974 approval of limited marketing and the risk management 
basis for the 1978 disapproval of general marketing. Part Ill will examine the 
review of the disapproval decision by a panel of scientific experts as a public 
board of inquiry. This article will contend that Depo-Provera's administrative od-
yssey has felt the interplay of science and politics at each stage of FDA's drug 
risk-management process. Consequently, the article will focus on the scientific 
and political aspects of the debate, i.e., the scientific basis of FDA's risk assess-
ments, the Agency's policy judgments about the drug's risk acceptability, and the 
scientific and political scrutiny of FDA's new drug decisions. 
I. PREMARKET TESTING OF DEPO-PROVERA 
Depo-Provera is a drug, manufactured by The Upjohn Co., whose active ingre-
dient is medroxyprogesterone acetate (MPA). FDA first approved the drug in 
1959 to treat amenorrhea,5 irregular uterine bleeding, and threatened and habitual 
abortion. The following year it was approved to treat endometriosis.6 Later FDA 
withdrew its approval for use of the drug in preventing miscarriage and endome-
triosis.7 In 1972, FDA also approved Depo-Provera as "[adljunctive therapy and 
2Jd. 
3 /d. 
4 Hadden, Generic Regulations and Generic Critics, 4 POLITICS AND THE LIFE SCIENCES 48, 49 
(1985) (citing Rushefsky, Assuming the Conclusions: Risk Assessment in the Development of Cancer 
Policy, 4 POLITICS AND THE LIFE SCIENCES 31, 32 (1985)). See also M. RUSHEFSKY, MAKING 
CANCER POLICY (1986). 
5 Amenorrhea is the absence of menstruation. MOSBY MED. ENCY. 30 (1985). 
6 Endometriosis is a growth of endometrial tissue outside the uterus. /d. at 259. 
7 FDA withdrew its approval in 1974 because the drug was not effective for these indications, nor 
was it safe for miscarriage. See 37 Fed. Reg. 15,033 (1972), 38 Fed. Reg. 27,949 (1973), and 39 Fed. 
Reg. 5221 (1974). 
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palliative treatment of inoperable, recurrent, and metastatic endometrial carci-
noma and renal carcinoma. " 8 Depo-Provera, injected intramuscularly in a 150 
mg. dose, can also prevent contraception for at least three months by suppressing 
the hormones which induce ovulation. 9 
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FD&C Act) and its 1962 
amendments require drugs be proven safe and effective. 10 Depo-Provera's effec-
tiveness is not in question. A single injection of the drug can stop ovulation for 
three months and is 99.8% effective in preventing pregnancy. 11 Safety is the issue. 
Scientific methods exist for determining drug safety, but their ability to determine 
a drug's carcinogenic risk is limited by the animal and human experiments used in 
FDA's premarket drug testing program. Premarket testing of drugs is based on 
experimental designs which are feasible prior to marketing. Small-scale and 
short-term animal studies assess the drug's therapeutic potential and safety for 
human testing. Animal studies, conducted for two or more years, assess long-
term human risk. Human clinical trials involving very small numbers of persons, 
which are used to confirm the animal findings on short-term toxicity, are followed 
by clinical trials, involving several thousand persons to assess a drug's efficacy 
and short-term risks. Yet the evidence these tests provide has limited value in 
assessing carcinogenic risk of drugs because the latency of this risk may be 
twenty years or more. 
Depo-Provera's premarket screening process began with Upjohn's initial 
screening which used animal tests to determine the drug's therapeutic applica-
tions. In 1963, the company submitted to FDA a Notice of Claimed Investiga-
tional Exemption for a New Drug (IND) in order to conduct human clinical trials 
to determine the drug's safety and efficacy as a female contraceptive. 12 The 
studies began in 1965. Two years later, Upjohn requested marketing approval by 
submitting a New Drug Application (NDA). 
Upjohn's NDA testing included two long-term animal toxicity studies initiated 
in 1968: a seven-year study of thirty-six beagle dogs and a ten-year study of fifty-
two rhesus monkeys. The results, in 1975, from the dog study revealed malignant 
breast tumors in two animals and led FDA in 1978 to disapprove Upjohn's NDA 
for Depo-Provera as an injectable contraceptive. 13 The results of the monkey 
study in 1979, which revealed endometrial cancer in two animals, and the results 
of the second study of 140 beagle dogs, which revealed breast cancer in twenty-
four animals, cast further doubt on the drug's safety,l4 These studies did not re-
8 PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE, 1939, 1940 (39th ed. 1985). 
9 38 Fed. Reg. 27,940 (1973). 
10 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, § 201(p) and Drug Amend-
ments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 102(b),(c). 
11 Depo-Provera has a failure rate of I per 100 women per year. This is substantially lower than 
user-failure rates for other methods: 2.4 for oral contraceptives, 4.6 for intrauterine devices, and 18.6 
for the diaphragm. 
12 The Depo-Provera Debate: Hearings Before the House Select Comm. on Population, 95th Cong., 
. 2d Sess. 303 (1978) (statement of Donald Kennedy, Comm'r of the Food and Drug Admin.). 
13 INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (IRDC), LONG-TERM DEPO-
PROVERA STUDY IN DOGS, FINAL REPORT (1975). 
14 IRDC, LONG-TERM DEPO-PROVERA STUDY IN MONKEYS, FINAL REPORT (1979) and DAWSON 
CORPORATION, LONG-TERM STUDY IN DOGS, INTERIM AND FINAL REPORT (1982). 
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solve the issue of the drug's carcinogenicity, but have become part of the debate 
because of the scientific controversy over two major issues: whether the animals 
were appropriate models on which to test the drug's human carcinogenicity and 
whether the high doses the animals received during the experiments were appro-
priate in light of the lower doses administered as a contraceptive to human fe-
males. 
Upjohn also sponsored human clinical studies to establish Depo-Provera's effi-
cacy, appropriate dose level, and "physiological consequences and side effects 
following short-term use, e.g., weight gain, prolonged amenorrhea or bleeding, 
return of ovulation, and psychological side effects. " 15 These studies were not 
designed to collect data on the drug's long-term effects, but they incidentally 
revealed a risk of cancer as early as 1971 when researchers found women exposed 
to Depo-Provera had a higher-than-normal rate of cervical cancer. It was not until 
after FDA disapproved the drug in 1978 that any plans were made to collect data 
systematically. 
Currently, there are over forty human studies of Depo-Provera designed for 
other purposes and "a few attempts at epidemiological studies" indicate a risk of 
breast and endometrial cancer. However, the studies contain major research 
flaws: small samples which do not include enough long-term users, lack of com-
parable control groups, failure to determine a subject's cancer risk, limited 
follow-ups to determine long-range cancer risk, and incomplete record keeping. 16 
These studies have become part of the debate, but not because of scientific con-
troversy over the data. Proponents of Depo-Provera agree the human data are 
probably inadequate but make the argument the quantity of the data can substi-
tute for its quality. "The human studies individually may be inconclusive and 
questionable," Upjohn has said, but "[t]hey are, in their totality, reassuring and 
sufficient to provide a basis for a regulatory decision.'' 17 
II. FDA DEPO-PROVERA DECISIONS 
Agencies make regulatory decisions which depend heavily upon an assessment 
of scientific evidence and a determination of what level of risk is acceptable. 
Depo-Provera's animal and human tests have not provided FDA's Center for 
Drugs and Biologics with a scientifically unambiguous body of information about 
the drug's carcinogenicity. Yet FDA has a legislative mandate and bureaucratic 
jurisdiction to decide whether the drug is safe for human use. How did the 
Agency, in the face of this uncertain scientific information, decide first to grant. 
Depo-Provera partial approval in 1974, and then, four years later, to reverse itself 
and disapprove the drug's use for contraception? FDA's actions will be examined 
in terms of two major features of its new drug approval risk-management deci-
15 J. WEISZ, G. ROSS & P. STOLLEY, REPORT OF THE PUBLIC BOARD OF INQUIRY ON DEPO-PRO-
VERA 5-6 (1984). 
16 /d. at 85. For a complete listing of the animal and human research studies, see id. at 70-79 and 
109-14. 
17 /d. at 85-87. 
DEPO-PROVERA 571 
sionmaking process: the advisory committee's review and recommendation and 
the Agency's decision, based on its assessment of the drug's risk and its determi-
nation of the risk's acceptability. 
The 1974 Decision: The Advisory Committee Role 
FDA's approval of an NDA is a license to a pharmaceutical company to market 
a drug. In making its decision, the Agency relies on advisory committees, be-
cause it is "faced with difficult scientific issue[s] without any simple testing 
method to determine risk. " 18 The committees provide the Agency with expertise 
not available in-house and the scientific community, the drug industry, and con-
sumers with the opportunity to participate in NDA approval decisions. 19 
When FDA announced its intention on October 9, 1973 to give Depo-Provera 
approval for limited contraceptive use, the order stated the Agency had relied on 
its Advisory Committee on Obstetrics and Gynecology's recommendation that 
Depo-Provera's risks outweighed its benefits for those women who found other 
methods of contraception unacceptable or difficult, or were mentally retarded 
and institutionalized. The order also stated FDA concurred in the advisory com-
mittee's recommendation the NDA be conditioned on cautionary measures to 
assure proper use, including a distribution restriction "to maintain a registry of 
physicians who have utilized the drug for contraception" and an informed con-
sent requirement the drug package include an informational leaflet and a detailed 
brochure to explain to the patient the drug's use and risks. 20 
This textbook use of an advisory committee became the subject of congres-
sional hearings on FDA's greatly increased use of advisory committees in NDA 
review. 21 When the House Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations, 
chaired by Representative L. H. Fountain (D-N.C.) reviewed the circumstances 
surrounding the Obstetrics and Gynecology Advisory Committee's affirmative 
recommendation of Depo-Provera's limited use, it found FDA had not relied 
upon the committee's scientific expertise. 
At the April 30, 1974 hearing, Representative Fountain's questions to Dr. J. 
Richard Crout, Director of FDA's Bureau of Drugs, and his examination of 
Agency documents, revealed that FDA medical officers, after a review of the 
Upjohn data in 1971 and 1972, had recommended discontinuance of further clin-
ical IND use because preliminary results from the beagle dog studies suggested 
the potential for human mammary carcinoma and human studies revealed cer-
vical cancer rates in excess of national incidence.22 The FDA medical officers' 
18 /d. at 82. 
19 Friedman, Representation in Regulatory Decision Making: Scientific. Industrial and Consumer 
Inputs to the F.D.A., 38 Pus. ADMIN. R. 206 (1978). 
2o 38 Fed. Reg. at 27,940. 
21 Use of Advisory Committees by the Food and Drug Admin.: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Intergovernmental Relations of the House Comm. on Governmental Relations, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 2 
(1977). 
22 See id. at 356 and 358-63. The principal source for research findings of excessive cervical cancer 
rates in clinical studies was Powell & Seymour, Effects of Depo-Medroxprogesterone Acetate as a 
Contraceptive Agent, 110 AM. J. 0BSTET. & GYNECOL. 36 (1971). 
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report stated: "Sixteen subjects [out of 3856] have developed Grade III pap 
smears while on therapy. Biopsy showed carcinoma in situ in all subjects and all 
subsequently underwent hysterectomy. " 23 The transcript of the February 22, 
1973 meeting of the Obstetrics and Gynecology Advisory Committee revealed 
"the cancer in situ figures were not discussed at any time during the committee's 
consideration of the safety of Depo-Provera. " 24 
What particularly troubled Representative Fountain was that FDA officials said 
nothing at the advisory committee meeting even though they had known about 
the substantial variance in the analysis of data by their medical officers and by 
Upjohn. FDA officials had also known both analyses confirmed rates of cervical 
cancer which exceeded the national incidence of risk. 25 Thus he concluded the 
committee was "in the unenviable position of having to decide about the safety of 
the drug without the full data before it. " 26 
FDA was apparently undeterred by this congressional scrutiny, because it is-
sued a final patient label rule on September 6, 1974 in anticipation of Depo-Pro-
vera's limited approvalY At this point, Congressman Fountain intervened. In a 
letter of protest to then-Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) 
Secretary Caspar Weinberger on October 2, 1974, he requested the Agency re-
voke the rule because "there were many serious and, as yet, unresolved ques-
tions concerning the drug's safety including the drug's role in causing cancer. " 28 
FDA Commissioner Alexander Schmidt, citing the need for public confidence in 
drug safety, subsequently stayed approval of the drug pending further advisory 
committee review of the scientific evidence.29 
23 Advisory Committee Hearings, supra note 21, at 361. Cancer in situ is cervical cancer and a 
Grade IV pap smear is "strongly suggestive of malignancy." /d. at 368 (quoting G. PAPANICOLAOU, 
ATLAS OF EXFOLIATIVE CYTOLOGY). 
24 Jd. at 369. 
25 ld. at 374-75. 
26 I d. at 375. The most concise statement of the House subcommittee's findings on FDA's Advisory 
Committee on Obstetrics and Gynecology was stated in a question by Rep. Fountain to Dr. Crout: 
If the evidence or data presented to the committee by Upjohn was not complete, as the 
participants at the committee meeting indicated during the closed session; if the significance 
for humans of cancer and tumor results in beagles is not known, as is revealed in the ver-
batim transcripts and in the FDA's October 10, 1973 Federal Register notice; if the facts, 
nature, and significance of the cases of cancer in situ were not presented to the committee or 
in any way discussed, as is apparent from the verbatim transcript; if there is not enough 
experience, because of the high discontinuation rate and other factors, to determine the 
extent of infertility caused by the drug, as indicated by the consultants; and if the problem of 
not being able to get rid of the drug once an adverse reaction occurs could not be resolved, as 
the transcript reveals at page 72, was the committee ready to make a benefits-risk determi-
nation? 
Dr. Crout, to Mr. Fountain's utter amazement, answered: "Yes." Jd. at 380. 
27 39 Fed. Reg. 32,907 (1974). 
28 39 Fed. Reg. 36,472 (1974). 
29 Jd. 
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The 1978 Disapproval Decision 
FDA's next review began when the Advisory Committee on Obstetrics and 
Gynecology held a joint meeting in April 1975 with the Advisory Committee on 
Biometric and Epidemiological Medicine, examined the scientific evidence, and 
appointed a subcommittee task force. The subcommittee held an open meeting in 
September 1975 and later recommended limited approvaJ.3° The Advisory Com-
mittee on Obstetrics and Gynecology discussed the subcommittee recommenda-
tion at its December 1975 meeting and, in spite of the just released beagle dog 
study which provided evidence of breast cancer, approved Depo-Provera for the 
same two limited groups of women and made the approval subject to the same 
conditions.31 This time FDA, after a lengthy Agency internal review, rejected the 
committee's recommendation and advised Upjohn by letter on March 7, 1978 that 
its NDA for the general marketing of Depo-Provera for contraceptive use had 
been disapproved. By formal notice on June 22, 1978, the Agency cited six 
grounds for disapproval and gave U pjohn notice of the opportunity for a 
hearing.32 An explanation of the Agency's action begins with an examination of 
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act's risk-assessment criteria. 
Risk Management Analysis 
The FD&C Act requires foods and drugs to be tested for their safety. The 
statute sets two risk-assessment criteria. Food additives, food colorings, and an-
imal drugs are evaluated on the basis of the Delaney Clause's single risk criteria: 
if they are carcinogenic in animals, they will not be approved regardless of their 
benefit. 33 Foodstuffs contaminated with pesticide residues are evaluated using a 
risk-benefit analysis. 34 The statute does not, however, specify a risk-assessment 
criteria for human drugs, but instead provides that FDA will approve or disap-
prove a drug on the basis of any one or more of sixteen standards for the drug's 
safety, effectiveness, manufacture, and labeling.35 The statute also recognizes the 
Agency's need for flexibility in applying these standards and in exercising "its 
scientific judgment to determine the kind and quality of data and information ... 
required to meet them. " 36 FDA, therefore, has broad statutory discretion to es-
tablish a human drug risk-assessment and -acceptability standards. 
Risk-Assessment Criteria 
FDA's disapproval of the limited and general marketing of Depo-Provera in 
1978 was formally based on two statutory grounds for refusal to approve an 
30 Depo-Provera Hearings, supra note 12, at 304. 
31 /d. 
32 43 Fed. Reg. 28,555 (1978). 
33 21 U.S.C. §§ 348(c)(3)(A), 376(b)(5)(B), and 360b(d)(I)(H) (1982). 
34 21 U.S.C. § 346(a). 
35 21 C.F.R. § 314.125(a)(l-16) (1987). 
3621 C.F.R. § 314.105(c). 
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NDA: insufficient information to determine whether the drug was a safe contra-
ceptive and test results which did not show it was safe.37 The disapproval deci-
sion was not, however, based on a published regulation which sets forth the 
Agency's criteria, nor is it clear what criteria FDA applied to disapprove the drug 
in 1978. There are three possibilities, the first two of which-no-risk analysis and 
risk-risk analysis-give no attention to the drug's benefits, nor to weighing its 
benefits and risks.3s 
First, the disapproval was based on an unwritten single risk factor criteria for 
assessing animal test results. As Dr. Victor Berliner of FDA's Bureau of Drugs 
stated: "an old toxicological principal is to spread the risk over species, at least 
two, preferably more, and to go by the least favorable results in any one of the 
species, as the leading deciding factor for evaluating toxicity or risk from a drug 
to the human. " 39 Depo-Provera was tested on three animal species: mice, rats, 
and dogs. The drug was not approved for human use as a contraceptive using this 
criteria because the beagle dog developed breast cancer. In this regard, the notice 
stated: "No other contraceptives that have such safety data are approved for 
marketing. "4° FDA Commissioner Donald Kennedy repeated this criteria for the 
House Select Committee on Population. "No other contraceptive approved for 
marketing,'' Kennedy said, "has shown a similar carcinogenic potential in the 
beagle assay. " 41 
Second, disapproval was based on multiple-risk criteria and a risk-risk anal-
ysis. The notice cited three potential risks: breast carcinoma suggested by the 
beagle dog study, increased congenital malformations from the drug's failure, and 
the risk from estrogen therapy to control irregular bleeding caused by Depo-Pro-
vera use.42 The notice also cited risk-risk analysis data. Risk-risk analysis in-
volves weighing the health risks of nonapproval against the health risk of ap-
proval, in order to determine whether disapproval would deprive the public of 
any countervailing health benefits.43 The notice stated Depo-Provera was disap-
proved because there were available "many safe and effective alternative 
methods of contraception and sterilization which have decreased the need for a 
long-term, potentially high risk injectable contraceptive. " 44 
Third, the disapproval decision was based on a risk-benefit analysis criteria. If 
the Agency's notice is read in conjunction with its 1973 and 1974 patient labeling 
regulation, it is clear the Agency gave attention to the drug's risks and benefits. 
37 43 Fed. Reg. at 28,556 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 314.125(b)(3),(4)). 
3S L. LAVE, THE STRATEGY OF SOCIAL REGULATION: DECISION FRAMEWORKS FOR POLICY 8-28 
(1981). 
39 Depo-Provera Hearings, supra note 12, at 58. 
40 43 Fed. Reg. at 28,556. 
41 Depo-Provera Hearings, supra note 12, at 308. 
42 43 Fed. Reg. at 28,556. 
43 Silverglade, The Risks of Risk Asssessment and Risk-Benefit Analysis, 38 FOOD DRUG CosM. 
L.J. 318, 323 (1983). 
44 43 Fed. Reg. at 28,556. 
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FDA was satisfied when it proposed its 1973 regulation that the studies had 
proven Depo-Provera's high contraceptive effectiveness. FDA acknowledged the 
beagle dog studies revealed the drug's potential for malignant breast tumors and 
the human clinical trials demonstrated the drug's potential for "prolonged and 
possibly permanent infertility ... [along with] less significant adverse reac-
tions. " 45 Nevertheless, the Agency concluded Depo-Provera's benefits out-
weighed its risks for the institutionalized mentally retarded, as long as the drug 
was provided with a required patient leaflet and brochure explaining the risks 
associated with its use and requiring the patient's, a parent's, or a guardian's 
informed consent prior to administration of the drug. When FDA issued its pa-
tient label regulation in 1974, it disposed of congressional concerns about the risk 
of cervical cancer and reaffirmed its belief the drug's benefits outweighed its risks 
for the same limited groups of women subject to the same requirements set out in 
the proposed rule to assure proper use. 46 
In 1978, FDA stated it was disapproving Depo-Provera, in part, because it 
found there was "no significant patient population meeting the criteria proposed 
in 1974 for use of the drug and for whom the benefits of the drug outweighed the 
risks. " 47 Thus, FDA concluded the drug "no longer has the positive risk-benefit 
ratio that it thought existed in 1974. " 48 
This risk-benefit analysis applies only to the FDA refusal to give Depo-Pro-
vera partial approval in 1978. Yet this disapproval of the drug's limited use did 
not, in fact, depend on risk analysis considerations at all, but on a risk-accept-
ability ground-the absence of a significant patient population-which will be 
discussed below. Does this risk-benefit analysis apply to the general marketing 
disapproval? The disapproval notice provides no evidence Depo-Provera had the 
same benefits for general marketing that it had for limited marketing, but that 
those benefits had been outweighed by the risk(s) identified under the no-risk or 
risk-risk analyses. 
FDA might have given less weight to Depo-Provera's risks under any of these 
three criteria if it had been impressed with a related risk-assessment factor, i.e., 
Upjohn's proposed postmarketing survey. FDA had required Upjohn to submit a 
proposed postmarketing study as part of its NDA because the premarketing re-
search had limited value in assessing the drug's long-term carcinogenic risk.49 
FDA denied Upjohn approval to market Depo-Provera, in part, because of "se-
rious reservations about the ability of Upjohn's proposed post-marketing study 
for breast and cervical carcinoma to yield meaningful data. " 50 Upjohn's proposed 
study, FDA concluded, "would require a much larger patient population than 
4
.1 38 Fed. Reg. at 27,940. 
46 39 Fed. Reg. at 32,909-10 (1974). 
47 43 Fed. Reg. at 28,556. 
48Jd. 
49 The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act does not authorize FDA to conduct postapproval drug moni-
toring and control of physician practices, but the Agency has increasingly taken potential postap-
proval problems into consideration in deciding whether to approve an NDA. 
so 43 Fed. Reg. at 28,556. 
576 WILLIAM GREEN 
proposed ... [and] Upjohn would have difficulty finding enough patients ... to 
complete them in time. "51 
Risk-Acceptability Judgments 
After FDA reached a negative risk assessment by relying upon one or more of 
the three possible criteria, it then had to confront the question: are the risks iden-
tified by the animal and human studies of Depo-Provera's use acceptable in light 
of the drug's demonstrated benefits? Risk acceptability, the second stage of the 
risk-management process, requires an agency to integrate "the results of risk 
assessment ... with social, economic, and political concerns to reach its deci-
sion. " 52 How did FDA determine Depo-Provera's use was an unacceptable risk? 
FDA's disapproval notice states it had three social and political concerns about 
Depo-Provera which, along with its risk assessment, led it to conclude the drug 
was an unacceptable contraceptive. Depo-Provera was disapproved for the lim-
ited population identified in 1974 because there was "no significant population in 
need of the drug. "53 
Depo-Provera was also disapproved for general marketing for three other non-
scientific reasons. First, the need for the drug, FDA claimed, had been decreased 
by the "availability ... of many safe and effective alternative methods of contra-
ception and sterilization which have become increasingly popular in recent 
years. " 54 Second, FDA claimed the labeling requirements would have limited 
value in controlling physician prescription practices and in assuring patient con-
sent. In 1974, FDA had proposed to approve Depo-Provera's limited contracep-
tive use subject to leaflet and brochure requirements. By 1978, it doubted the 
value of such "cautionary measures"55 because there was "strong evidence 
Depo-Provera is being used for non-labeled indications. " 56 Approval, FDA ar-
gued, would only increase the likelihood "Depo-Provera will be put to non-ap-
proved uses for which the benefits do not exceed the risks. " 57 Third, FDA 
claimed approval would increase a woman's risk of cancer because "physicians 
would be likely simutaneously to prescribe estrogens to patients in an attempt to 
control irregular uterine bleeding" caused by Depo-Provera use. 58 
Political Consequences 
FDA's disapproval of Depo-Provera was a limited risk-management decision. 
Disapproval did not alter the drug's IND status nor prohibit physicians on their 
51 /d. 
52 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note I. 
53 43 Fed. Reg. at 28,556. 
54 /d. 
55 38 Fed. Reg. at 27,940. 
56 43 Fed. Reg. at 28,556. 
57 /d. 
58Jd. 
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own authority from prescribing it for contraceptive use;59 the disapproval only 
prohibited the drug's domestic marketing and export "based upon the agency's 
analysis of risk-benefit considerations in the United States. " 60 Disapproval did 
not affect Depo-Provera's manufacture and sale by Upjohn's Belgian and Cana-
dian subsidiaries to seventy foreign nations, who have approved the drug's con-
traceptive use, and to international population organizations, including the World 
Health Organization (WHO) and International Planned Parenthood Federation 
(IPPF) which dispense it in their Third World population control programs.61 
Depo-Provera, with sales of $25 million, is used by 1.25 million women world-
wide. 
FDA disapproval did, however, have an impact on Depo-Provera's contracep-
tive use overseas even though the Agency did not take into consideration, as its 
disapproval notice states, two risk-acceptability factors-the lesser availability 
of alternative methods of contraception and the lower quality of health care-
that would probably have resulted in a different risk-management decision in 
other countries.62 First, disapproval limited the drug's use in U.S. foreign aid 
programs. The U.S. Agency for International Development policy prohibits the 
Agency from exporting or directly financing the overseas purchase of nonap-
proved drugs. 63 Second, disapproval raised doubts, especially in developing na-
tions that rely on FDA's risk-management decisions, about the drug's safety. 
FDA disapproval eventually led five countries to reverse their approvals to avoid 
charges of distributing an unsafe drug. 64 
59 FDA's decision about an NDA does not affect a drug's use on an investigational basis, nor does it 
affect the discretion physicians have to prescribe an approved drug for an unapproved use. In fact, 
Depo-Provera is prescribed as a. contraceptive especially in low-income areas and among black, His-
panic, and Indian women. See Congress Questions Indian Health Service Use of Depo-Provera, PMA 
NEWSLETIER, July 20, 1971, at 2-3. 
Depo-Provera is also used experimentally to treat male sexual disorders and has been criticized on 
medical and legal grounds. See Comment, Sexual Offenders and the Use of Depo-Provera, 22 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 565 (1985); Demsky, The Use of Depo-Provera in the Treatment of Sex Offenders, 5 J. 
LEGAL MED. 295 (1984); and Comment, The Use of Depo-Proverafor Treating Male Sex Offenders: A 
Review of the Constitutional and Medical Issues, 16 TOLEDO L. REV. 181 (1984). 
Depo-Provera's use as a probation condition for convicted rapists, often characterized as chemical 
castration, has also met with an unfavorable judicial reception. In the most widely publicized case, 
People v. Gauntlett, 134 Mich. App. 737, 352 N.W.2d 310, modified, 419 Mich. 909,353 N.W.2d 463 
(1984), the Michigan Supreme Court overturned a probation condition requiring weekly injections of 
Depo-Provera to an Upjohn heir convicted of statutory rape. See Green, Depo-Provera, Castration, 
and the Probation of Rape Offenders: Statutory and Constitutional Issues, 12 U. DAYTON L. REV. I 
(1986). 
60 43 Fed. Reg. at 28,556. See Fox & Allard, Exporting United States Pharmaceuticals in the 
1980's, 39 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 411 (1984). 
61 Depo-Provera is also available internationally for contraceptive use; drugs with IND approval 
may be exported with a certification which limits their use to that foreign country. 
62 43 Fed. Reg. at 28,556. 
63 The Agency for International Development (AID) does, however, continue to support the pur-
chase of Depo-Provera, because Agency policy does not prohibit indirect financing of the United 
Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA), the International Fertility Research Program, and 
the Family Planning International Assistance which supply contraceptives, including Depo-Provera, 
to developing nations. 
64 The countries are Egypt, Jordan, Korea, Taiwan, and Yemen. 
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The House Select Committee on Population hearings provided the first forum 
to critique the scientific basis for FDA's risk assessment and the international 
consequences of its risk-acceptability judgment. In three days of hearings, Au-
gust 10-12, 1978, the committee provided the representatives of WHO and IPPF, 
along with those from the International Fertility Program and the Population 
Council, with the opportunity to testify that FDA's action made a needed contra-
ceptive less available to women in developing nations and that pending legisla-
tion, the Drug Regulation Reform Act of 1978, would improve the situation by 
permitting the export of nonapproved drugs.65 
The House committee also took the opportunity to criticize the basis for the 
Agency's scientific assessment and its determination of domestic patient need. 
Chairman James Scheuer (D-N.Y.) questioned FDA's use of the animal test data 
in making national and international policy, because there was no scientific con-
sensus on the use of the beagle d9g to test for the possibility of human cancer.66 
Representative Paui N. (Pete) McCloskey, Jr. (R-Cal.) argued FDA's disapproval 
of Depo-Provera on the grounds there was no significant patient population in 
need of the drug went "beyond [its] scientific and pharmacological expertise ... 
[and] beyond FDA safety questions. " 67 When FDA officials told him their con-
clusion had not been based on any scientific studies, but on letters, phone conver-
sations, and the absence of "clamor for approval, " 68 he replied: "Public clamor 
-I would hope that an agency like the FDA, in order to preserve its scientific 
integrity, would not be reacting to public clamor.' '69 This criticism was the extent 
of congressional oversight. As a consequence, the only immediate recourse avail-
able to Upjohn was internal Agency review.70 
Ill. PUBLIC BOARD OF INQUIRY REVIEW 
Upjohn had the right to challenge FDA's disapproval of Depo-Provera in a full 
evidentiary public hearing before an administrative law judge.71 The company 
65 Depo-Provera Hearings, supra note 12. For a general discussion of the congressional hearing, see 
Maine, Depo: The Debate Continues, 10 FAMILY PLANNING PERSP. 342 (1978). 
66 Depo-Provera Hearings, supra note 12, at 64. 
67 /d. at 69. 
68 /d. at 70. 
69 /d. 
70 After the failure of drug reform legislation, AID was also prevailed upon to make an exception to 
its policy which prohibits the Agency from exporting or directly financing the purchase overseas of 
FDA nonapproved drugs. AID convened a research panel-the AID Ad Hoc Consultative Panel-
which found the research had not demonstrated Depo-Provera's carcinogenicity. The beagle and 
monkey studies were inconclusive, as were the human data from the study of 86,000 Thai women. At 
the same time, the AID panel found the drug had substantial benefits for women in developing coun-
tries including its long-lasting effectiveness, its advantage for women who breast feed, and its ease of 
administration. Balancing Depo-Provera's risks and benefits, the AID panel, like the WHO and IPPF 
committees, recommended approval, but the Agency has yet to alter its policy. 
For a general discussion of these reports, see Gold & Willson, Depo-Provera: New Developments in 
a Decade-Old Controversy, 13 FAMILY PLANNING PERSP. 35 (1981); Rosenfield Maine, Rochat, 
Shelton & Hatcher, The Food and Drug Administration and Medroxyprogesterone Acetate: What Are 
the Issues?, 249 J. A.M.A. 2922 (1983); and Sun; Depo-Provera Debate Revs Up at FDA, 217 
SCIENCE 424 (1982). 
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made the request on July 24, 1978, but waived that right two weeks after the 
congressional hearings and requested instead a review procedure which has been 
invoked only once before in FDA's history: a hearing before a public board of 
inquiry. 72 
A board of inquiry is a highly specialized administrative creation whose pur-
pose is "to review medical, scientific, and technical issues. " 73 FDA regulations 
indicate a board of inquiry serves in a consultative capacity, but it is not an advi-
sory committee: "A Board functions as an administrative law tribunal. " 74 Its 
proceedings are not, however, a legal trial, but "a scientific inquiry"75 conducted 
as an informal hearing. 76 Its findings and conclusions have the legal status of an 
initial Agency decision. 77 This analysis of the public board of inquiry's review of 
FDA's decision on Depo-Provera will focus on three subjects: its mandate, its 
hearings, and its risk-management recommendation. 
Board of Inquiry: Its Members and Its Mandate 
FDA Commissioner Donald Kennedy accepted Upjohn's request for a public 
board of inquiry on October 24, 1978 and also approved an Upjohn request to 
delay the hearing until the company could analyze the data from the recently 
completed rhesus monkey study. Upjohn notified FDA on April 25, 1979 that its 
review was complete. Then on July 27, 1979, the Commissioner ordered a hearing 
before ine public board of inquiry. 78 Two years intervened before the board 
members were appointed. 79 Commissioner Arthur Hull Hayes finally appointed 
three eminent scientists in September 1981: Judith Weisz as chairperson and Griff 
T. Ross and Paul Stolley as members. 80 
The public board of inquiry was charged with reviewing FDA's drug risk-man-
agement decision. The board's mandate did not, however, involve a mirror-image 
review of the scientific evidence and the risk-acceptability grounds of FDA's de-
cision. The scientific risk-assessment issues the board was ordered to address 
included two grounds which had served as the basis for FDA disapproval-
Depo-Provera's risk of breast cancer suggested by the beagle dog study and the 
drug's teratogenic effect-along with two new issues involving the drug's carci-
nogenic risk. The animal data now included the second beagle dog study and the 
rhesus monkey study where the issue was "whether the data ... indicate a po-
tential risk of ... endometrial cancer in humans. " 81 The human clinical data 
72 The first public board of inquiry had been established to review the FDA's approval of aspar-
tame. 44 Fed. Reg. 31,716 (1979). 
73 21 C.F.R. § 13.30(a). 
74 Id. § 13.10(e). 
75 ld. § 13.30(a). 
76 Id. § 13.30(d). 
77 Id. § 13.40. 
78 44 Fed. Reg. 44,274 (1979). 
79 The choice of public board of inquiry members is governed by 21 C.F.R. § 13.10(c). 
80 Dr. Judith Weisz, Head, Div. of Reproductive Biology, Dep't of Obstetrics and Gynecology, Her-
shey Medical Center, Penn. State Univ.; Dr. Griff T. Ross, Assoc. Dean, Clinical Affairs, Univ. of 
Tex. at Houston; and Dr. Paul Stolley, Prof. of Medicine and Research Medicine, School of Medicine, 
Univ. of Penn. 
8t 44 Fed. Reg. at 44,275. 
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issue was also included at Upjohn's request, because the pharmaceutical com-
pany believed the data "would successfully refute the risk of cancer suggested by 
the animal data.' •82 
The board was ordered to address four risk-acceptability issues, two of which 
had served as grounds for disapproval: whether general marketing was likely to 
increase Depo-Provera's use for nonlabeled conditions and unrelated indications 
and whether estrogen therapy was likely to be prescribed for Depo-Provera's side 
effects.83 The board was also ordered to address two new risk-acceptability issues 
in making recommendations about limited and general marketing. A recommen-
dation for limited marketing was required to consider "whether there are condi-
tions of labeling and distribution controls which would permit [safe and limited] 
marketing. " 84 
The board's recommendation for general marketing approval was to be based 
on a risk-risk analysis of Depo-Provera when compared with drugs FDA ap-
proved for contraceptive use. 85 In making a recommendation for either limited or 
general marketing approval, the board was required to restrict its risk-manage-
ment analysis to the United States.86 In sum, the order of July 27, 1979 required 
the public board of inquiry to hear testimony assessing the drug risk and deter-
mining its acceptability for contraceptive use and then to address both scientific 
and policy issues in making a risk-management recommendation. 
Board of Inquiry Hearing 
The public board of inquiry heard five days of testimony on January 10-14, 
1983 from all major participants in the Depo-Provera debate: the pharmaceutical 
industry; medical organizations; population control, consumers', and women's 
groups; and government agencies including FDA.87 Their testimony was not re-
stricted to the information which served as the basis for the FDA disapproval 
action, but included a wider range of scientific evidence and alternative analyses 
82Jd. 
83 /d. One risk-acceptability ground which had served as basis for disapproval was, however, curi-
ously absent: whether Upjohn's proposed postmarketing study for breast and cervical cancer could 
yield meaningful data. 43 Fed. Reg. 28,555 (1978). 
84 44 Fed. Reg. at 44,275. Limited approval, unlike the 1978 disapproval action, would not depend 
upon one risk-acceptability factor, but upon the existence of a significant domestic population in need 
of the drug. 43 Fed. Reg. at 28,556. 
8s 44 Fed. Reg. at 44,275. FDA's risk-risk analysis, by way of contrast, had served as a ground for 
its disapproval of limited marketing. 43 Fed. Reg. 28,555 (1978). 
86 44 Fed. Reg. at 44,275. 
87 J. WEISZ, G. Ross & P. STOLLEY, supra note 15, at 4. Among those organizations represented at 
the hearing, in addition to Upjohn and FDA's Center for Drugs and Biologics, were the World Health 
Organization (WHO), the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF), the U.S. Agency for 
Int'l Dev., the Women's Nat') Health Network, the Health Research Group, the Inst. for the Study of 
Medical Ethics, and the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology. 
See for a general discussion of the public board of inquiry hearings: Chen, Depo-Provera Under 
Scrutiny, 123 SCI. NEWS 122 (1983) and Gold, Depo-Debate Continues, 15 FAMILY PLANNING PERSP. 
78 (1983). 
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of that evidence. 88 The two foci of the testimony were the assessments and ac-
ceptability of the drug's risk. 
The scientific information now included the rhesus monkey study and the 
beagle dog study. Upjohn argued the test results should be minimized because the 
beagle dog was an inappropriate test model. The dog metabolized progestins dif-
ferently from humans and was prone to mammary tumors. The monkey studies, it 
argued, should also be discounted because endometrial cancer developed sponta-
neously from a cell type which had no human counterpart. The scientific infor-
mation also included human test data which had not directly served as a basis for 
FDA disapproval in 1978. Upjohn agreed the data from over forty studies might 
be questionable on scientific grounds, but argued they were "in totality, reas-
suring and sufficient to provide the basis for a regulatory decision. " 89 Moreover, 
the preliminary data from a WHO nine-nation study did not implicate Depo-Pro-
vera as the cause of human cancer. 
The testimony on risk acceptability focused primarily on the international im-
plications of Depo-Provera's nonapproved status. WHO and IPPF representa-
tives argued that FDA's decision had had a significant impact on decisions devel-
oping nations had made about Depo-Provera's use; but the Agency's risk-accept-
ability judgment had not been based on considerations relevant to those nations. 
They claimed the drug was a desirable contraceptive for women in the Third 
World where fertility and maternal mortality rates were extremely high, other 
methods of contraception were less available and desirable, and the health care 
system was less advanced and less extensive. The drug was preferable for women 
who breast-feed, because, unlike oral contraceptives, it did not suppress lacta-
tion. The drug was also preferable because it did not require storage under diffi-
cult conditions, nor did its administration require a clinic setting-it could be 
given, even in remote areas, by trained nonprofessionals. 
Board of Inquiry Report 
The public board of inquiry members took over a year to examine the research 
data and analyses, and to write their report; a 207-page document issued on Oc-
tober 17, 1984.90 The board considered its "primary task to be to evaluate the 
scientific validity of the information available. " 91 Since their report had the legal 
88 The alternative post-1978 Depo-Provera analyses include the following: lNT'L PLANNED PARENT-
HOOD FEDERATION, STATEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL ADVISORY PANEL ON DEPO-
PROVERA (1980); WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, SPECIAL PROGRAMME OF RESEARCH, DEVELOP-
MENT AND RESEARCH TRAINING IN HUMAN REPRODUCTION, STATEMENT ON SAFETY OF THE LONG-
ACTING INJECTABLE CONTRACEPTIVE DEPO-PROVERA (1978); and U.S. AGENCY FOR lNT'L DEY., 
REPORT OF THE AD-HOC PANEL ON DEPO MEDROXYPROGESTERONE ACETATE (1980). 
For a general discussion of these analyses, see Gold & Willson, Depo-Provera: New Developments 
in a Decade-Old Controversy, 13 FAMILY PLANNING PERSP. 35 (1981); Sun, Depo-Provera 
Debate Revs Up at FDA, 217 SCIENCE 424 (1982); and Rosenfield, Maine, Rochat, Shelton & 
Hatcher, The Food and Drug Administration and Medroxyprogesterone Acetate: What Are the 
Issues?, 249 J. A.M.A. 2922 (1983). 
89 J. WEISZ, G. Ross & P. STOLLEY, supra note 15, at 82. 
90 /d. at 5-6. 
91 /d. at 5. 
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status of an initial decision,92 the board "attempted to determine how much of 
this information qualified as facts [as distinguished from assumptions and hypoth-
eses] on which definitive conclusions could be based. " 93 The board then reor-
dered the seven questions it had been required to address to evaluate the distinc-
tion between scientific assessment of risk and policy judgments about risk accept-
ability. "We have reordered the sequence," the report stated, "so that the 
scientific evidence available for assessing the risks ... required to arrive at a 
regulatory decision, is presented first and evaluated before considering the regu-
latory decision itself. " 94 Thus, the board first gave detailed consideration to 
Questions 2, 3, and 5 which concerned Depo-Provera's carcinogenic and terato-
genic potential, and then briefly discussed Questions 1, 4, 6, and 7 which involved 
judgments about the drug's marketing. 
Risk-Assessment Analysis 
The board of inquiry's review of the scientific evidence began with the issue 
raised by Question 2: whether the beagle dog study and rhesus monkey study 
data indicated a potential risk of breast or endometrial cancer in humans from 
Depo-Provera. The board's examination of this research focused on three sub-
issues, i.e., whether the malignancies were drug-related, whether there was a 
dose-response relationship, and whether the animals' progestogen response was 
applicable to humans. The board found the first beagle dog study was unable to 
address these issues because it was poorly designed and executed. However, the 
second study, well designed and executed, provided "evidence that the mam-
mary carcinomas in the dogs were drug-related .... There was also [a] good indi-
cation of dose-response relationship: malignancies developed both more fre-
quently and earlier with increasing doses of DMPA. " 95 
The monkey data was more problematic. The development of malignancies in 
the rhesus monkey, unlike the beagle dog, were unanticipated. Dr. Weisz estab-
lished an expert committee of six pathologists to review the monkey research. 
The pathologists presented their report at a second hearing on August 12, 1983.96 
They unanimously concluded ''progestogens can elicit a malignant transforma-
tion in the uterus of monkeys. " 97 The board was, however, unable to determine 
whether there was a dose-response relationship because "the study was poorly 
designed and executed, the number of controls and animals receiving lower doses 
92 21 C.F.R. §§ 12.20, 13.40(c)(l). 
93 J. WEISZ, G. Ross & P. STOLLEY, supra note 15, at 5. 
94 /d. at 7. 
95 /d. 
96 48 Fed. Reg. 31,910 (1983). 
97 J. WEISZ, G. Ross & P. STOLLEY, supra note 15, at 33. The summary in the board of inquiry 
report is based on REPORT OF GROUP OF PATHOLOGY CONSULTANTS DESIGNATED BY THE DEPO-
PROVERA BOARD OF INQUIRY TO EVALUATE AND DETERMINE THE NATURE OF UP JOHN COMPANY'S 
RHESUS MONKEY'S UTERINE TUMORS OBSERVED IN THE LONG-TERM IRDC STUDY (1983). 
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of DMPA was much too small and the pathological examinations too inade-
quate. " 98 
The board then examined in detail, and dismissed Upjohn's argument, whether 
the beagle dog and rhesus monkey were inappropriate models for testing the 
long-term effects of progestogens on human females. Since Depo-Provera had 
"exhibited the characteristics of a potential carcinogen [in the animal studies] 
according to generally accepted criteria," the board was unwilling "to dismiss 
the findings as ~rrelevant to the human ... [because there was no] conclusive 
evidence of fundamental differences among the species in the basic mechanisms 
of action of the· hormone or in the response of target cells. " 99 Little research 
supported Upjohn's argument that the beagle responds differently to proges-
togens than a woman. No research supported Upjohn's argument that monkeys 
possessed a special cell type that made them more prone to endometrial cancer. 
The board then turned to the issue raised by Question 3: whether the human 
data submitted by Upjohn could successfully refute the risk of human cancer 
from Depo-Provera suggested by the animal data. In general, the board found the 
human data inadequate, because it was not based on studies which addressed the 
issue of cancer, was not derived from epidemiological studies, and if they were, 
suffered from major research design and execution limitations. The board's cri-
tique of the human studies was organized in terms of the research findings on 
breast, cervical, and endometrial cancer. 
The breast cancer data first came from an IND study of 11,631 women, but the 
board found the data of limited value because it was "pooled" from over eighty 
different research centers. As a consequence, it was "not possible to assess the 
significance of five cases of breast cancer in a mixed population of subjects. " 100 A 
major problem with the studies involving the incidence of breast cancer was that 
they were descriptive clinical reports which were not designed to provide epide-
miological data. 101 Whether retrospective or prospective studies, they included 
too few long-term users, too short a period of follow-up, a lack of information 
about the subject's medical history, inadequate or inappropriate controls, and a 
lack of documentation. The board concluded: ''If the same standards are applied 
equally to all studies, we are left essentially without information on the effect that 
the use of DMPA as a contraceptive may have on the incidence of breast 
cancer. " 102 
Cervical cancer from Depo-Provera use had gained political attention when 
Representative Fountain relied on the findings from an IND research study to 
gain a stay of FDA's proposed limited approval of the drug in 1974. The board 
was critical of this study not only because "the cervical abnormalities were diag-
nosed only a short time after the initiation of drug use," but also because the 
study was poorly designed and executed. 103 "The data were collected from sub-
98 J. WEISZ, G. Ross & P. STOLLEY, supra note 15, at 32. 
99 /d. at 174. 
100 /d. at 88. 
101 Id. at 89. 
102 !d. at 107. 
103 /d. at 102. 
? 
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jects at various centers, both in and outside the United States representing dif-
ferent populations with unknown background incidence of cervical cancer.'' 104 
The board also found no other appropriately designed epidemiological study of 
Depo-Provera addressed the issue of cervical cancer until after FDA's disap-
proval action in 1978. The World Health Organization initiated a study in 1979, 
but it had not been completed by the time the board issued its report. Thus, the 
board concluded: "Until reports from the above studies are published, the early 
suggestions that the drug may increase the incidence of cervical neoplasia cannot 
be dismissed. " 105 
Endometrial cancer evidence was based primarily on endometrial biopsies. The 
early biopsies, the board found, were not designed to study endometrial cancer. 
Studies conducted after the discovery of endometrial cancer in the rhesus . 
monkey were flawed because the number of subjects in the three biopsy studies 
was too small and the two retrospective epidemiological studies had a serious · 
lack of information on the subjects. In the Thai study, the subjects were identified 
from hospital records; the Mexican study diagnoses were obtained from death 
certificates. Thus, the board concluded: "There are no data available that could 
serve as a basis for deciding whether the use of DMPA as a contraceptive has an 
effect on the incidence of [human] endometrial cancer." 106 
After an exhaustive survey of this scientific data on breast, cervical, and endo-
metrial cancer, the board of inquiry rejected Upjohn's argument that the quantity 
of this data could substitute for its quality, and voluntary reporting could substi-
tute for specific studies. 107 What was needed, but what had only begun after 
FDA's 1978 disapproval action, were appropriately designed studies which would 
"collect data in a systematic manner from humans on the consequences of long-
term use of Depo-Provera. " 108 
Risk-Acceptability Judgments 
When the board of inquiry examined the four risk-acceptability issues, its 
treatment was brief and its analysis almost exclusively scientific. The board dis-
missed the estrogen therapy issue, Question 6, in one page with the conclusion 
estrogen use was unlikely because ''there appears to be a consensus ... that 
estrogen is ineffective in either treating or arresting uterine bleeding caused by 
DMPA." 109 The board then reformulated the risk-acceptability issues and in ten 
pages discussed them jointly with its recommendations on limited and general 
marketing. 
Depo-Provera's general marketing approval depended upon its benefits out-
weighing its risks in comparison with other FDA-approved contraceptive drugs, 
but the board was unable to weigh the benefits and risks and was, therefore, 
104 /d. at 103. 
105 /d. at 106. 
106 /d. at 100. 
107 /d. at 84-85. 
108Jd. 
109 /d. at 145. 
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unable to conduct a risk-risk analysis. The drug's benefits, it said, were clear and 
its short-term side effects had been well documented. "Neither the short-term 
side effects of the drug, nor its teratogenic potential should constitute a reason for 
not proposing to use DMPA. "110 
What troubled the board was its inability to assess the drug's long-term carci-
nogenic effects. "The available evidence presented fails to provide an adequate, 
scientifically justifiable basis for concluding whether the use of DMPA as a con-
traceptive does or does not pose any long-term risks. " 111 In the absence of this 
evidence, the board was unable to recommend general marketing approval be-
cause there was "no valid basis for comparing the risks of DMPA with those of 
other contraceptives." 112 This conclusion allowed the board to avoid as "largely 
irrelevant" the issue of the drug's potential for increased unapproved use under 
general marketing conditions. 113 The board did, however, reject obiter the view a 
drug's possible nonapproved uses should influence an NDA decision because 
"[i]t ... is FDA policy not to regulate the physician's practice of medicine in 
prescribing approved drugs for unapproved indications. " 114 
Depo-Provera's limited marketing approval, per Question 7, depended upon 
whether there was adequate control of its distribution to patients with special 
needs. The board acknowledged this patient population existed, but disagreed 
over limited approval. Dr. Ross recommended approval, if feasible, for the men-
tally retarded and for drug addicts, 115 but Drs. Weisz and Stolley were unwilling 
to recommend limited approval for two reasons. First, they did not "think it de-
sirable that FDA set up broad categories of indications ... since ... the drug is 
likely to be appropriate only for selected patients within each category." 116 They 
preferred instead to have the decision about Depo-Provera's use made on "an 
individual basis and with informed consent," because it would avoid the need for 
limited marketing approval. 117 "DMPA is currently approved ... for use for 
other indications. " 118 Second, they did not believe FDA had any effective mecha-
nisms to limit the drug's distribution only to patients with special needs or to 
collect information from them in a systematic manner about its use. 119 These two 
risk-acceptability judgments, unlike those made about general marketing, were 
neither well argued nor scientifically well documented by the two members. The 
first was merely based on a preference for an alternative procedure through an 
NDA loophole, while the second was briefly stated in conclusory language 
without any supporting scientific evidence. 
110 /d. at 162. 
111 /d. at 160. 
112 /d. at 165. 
113 Id. at 166. 
114 /d. at 167. 
115 /d. at 170, 181. 
116 /d. at 169. 
117 /d. 
118 /d. at 169-70. 
119 /d. at 170. 
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Risk-Management Recommendation 
The public board of inquiry recommended Depo-Provera should not be ap-
proved for general marketing. The action was based on the following finding of 
scientific fact: the "[D]ata available on the long-term risks of DMPA are insuffi-
cient and inadequate to provide a basis for a decision whether the benefits of the 
drug as a contraceptive outweigh its disadvantages under conditions of general 
marketing in the USA. " 120 This factual finding led the board to reach a conclusion 
of law identical to FDA's 1978 disapproval action: Upjohn's NDA for Depo-Pro-
vera for contraceptive use "does not contain reports of investigations adequate to 
show that the drug is safe for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, 
or suggested in the labeling ... [which when] combined with other information 
about the drug, does not provide [a] sufficient basis from which FDA can deter-
mine that DMPA is safe for general marketing. '' 121 As noted earlier, this finding of 
fact and conclusion of law have the status of an initial Agency decision. 122 The 
board of inquiry did not, however, reach any factual findings or legal conclusions 
about limited marketing. Thus, the board's recommendation provided substantial 
scientific support for FDA's decision to deny Depo-Provera general marketing 
approval. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Depo-Provera's administrative odyssey confronted the interplay of science and 
politics at each of the major stages in FDA's drug risk-management process: pre-
market testing, Agency decisionmaking, and external review. FDA's premarket 
testing of Depo-Provera assured the Agency would have to rely on uncertain sci-
entific research because these studies are designed to assess the drug's efficacy 
and short-term risks, but not the long-term risk of cancer. When FDA relied on 
animal and human studies to decide whether to grant Depo-Provera marketing 
approval, criticism of the scientific basis of this research became a central ele-
ment in the political controversy over Depo-Provera, not for its science alone, but 
because of the manner in which the Agency's risk-acceptability judgment inte-
grated its assessment of the drug's carcinogenic risk with its social, economic, 
and political interests in regulating domestic contraceptive use. 
The FDA risk-management decisions on Depo-Provera were based on its broad 
statutory discretion. In 1974, the Bureau of Drugs assessed the drug's risk and its 
acceptability for limited marketing and then turned to the Advisory Committee on 
Obstetrics and Gynecology, not for the panel's recommendation, but for its stamp 
of approval. In 1974 and 1978, FDA's decisions about limited and general mar-
keting were not based on any criteria set out in Agency regulations to assess the 
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drug's carcinogenic risks. The Agency's determination of the acceptability of the 
drug's risk'was also not based on any scientific studies and arguably went beyond 
the Agency's scientific expertise and statutory mandate. This administrative dis-
cretion has, however, had its political limits. The 1974 approval decision was 
criticized on risk-assessment grounds and subsequently stayed by the interven-
tion of a consumer-oriented congressman. The 1978 disapproval decision met 
with minor criticism for its assessment of risk and domestic acceptability and 
with an unsuccessful attempt to moderate its international consequences through 
reform of the drug export laws. FDA's exercise of its regulatory discretion also 
has had its scientific and legal limits. 
FDA's 1978 disapproval decision was subject to internal Agency review before 
an administrative law judge, but Upjohn opted instead for review by a public 
board of inquiry, a panel of scientific experts whose risk-management recommen-
dation has the status of an initial Agency decision. The board of inquiry was 
ordered to consider both risk-assessment and risk-acceptability issues. However, 
the board confined its analysis to a scientific assessment of the animal and human 
research, briefly discussed the marketing issues from a scientific perspective, and 
reminded the Agency, obiter, that risk-acceptability judgments based on a con-
cern with physician prescribing practices were beyond its province. In sum, the 
board of inquiry's report has settled, for now, on a scientific basis, FDA's refusal 
to grant Depo-Provera general marketing approval, but not its refusal of limited 
approval for a well-defined patient population. 
What is the likelihood FDA will reconsider its refusal to approve Depo-Pro-
vera? FDA is willing to certify the drug's safety and approve an amended NDA 
for general marketing ifUpjohn demonstrates the animal test results are not rele-
vant or that better designed human studies show the drug is not carcinogenic. 
FDA is also willing to grant Depo-Provera limited approval if a well-defined pa-
tient population exists for which the carcinogenic risks suggested by the animal 
and human studies are overcome by unusually great benefits. No new animal 
experiments are being considered, but human studies are being conducted by the 
Centers for Disease Control, the International Fertility Research Program, Up-
john, and the World Health Organization which may provide evidence sufficient 
to ameliorate the conclusions of the beagle and monkey studies. Upjohn's is a 
well-designed epidemiological study of New Zealand women who use Depo-Pro-
vera. The WHO's is a $1 million, nine-nation case control study of potential 
cancer risk from various contraceptives, including Depo-Provera. If the evidence 
from these studies is favorable, FDA will, once again, have to make a risk-man-
agement decision, the core of which will be its new assessment ofDepo-Provera's 
carcinogenic risk. 
